Status, quality and specific needs of Ebola virus diagnostic capacity and capability in laboratories of the two European preparedness laboratory networks EMERGE and EVD-LabNet by Reusken, Chantal B. et al.
1www.eurosurveillance.org
Euroroundup
Status, quality and specific needs of Ebola virus 
diagnostic capacity and capability in laboratories of 
the two European preparedness laboratory networks 
EMERGE and EVD-LabNet
Chantal B Reusken1, Ramona Mögling1, Pieter W Smit1, Roland Grunow2, Giuseppe Ippolito3, Antonino Di Caro3, Marion 
Koopmans1
1. Department of Viroscience, World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Arbovirus and Viral Haemorrhagic Fever 
Reference and Research, Erasmus University Medical Centre, Rotterdam, the Netherlands
2. Robert Koch Institute, Berlin, Germany
3. National Institute for Infectious Diseases (INMI) Lazzaro Spallanzani, Rome, Italy
Correspondence: Chantal Reusken (c.reusken@erasmusmc.nl)
Citation style for this article: 
Reusken Chantal B, Mögling Ramona, Smit Pieter W, Grunow Roland, Ippolito Giuseppe, Di Caro Antonino, Koopmans Marion. Status, quality and specific needs 
of Ebola virus diagnostic capacity and capability in laboratories of the two European preparedness laboratory networks EMERGE and EVD-LabNet. Euro Surveill. 
2018;23(19):pii=17-00404. https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2018.23.19.17-00404 
Article submitted on 21 Jun 2017 / accepted on 14 Dec 2017 / published on 10 May 2018
From December 2013 to March 2016, West Africa expe-
rienced the largest Ebola virus (EBOV) outbreak to 
date, leading to a European-wide activation of labora-
tory preparedness and response. At the end of the out-
break, laboratories associated with the two European 
preparedness networks of expert laboratories EMERGE 
JA and EVD-LabNet were invited to participate in an 
assessment of the response of European laborato-
ries to the EBOV outbreak, to identify learning points 
and training needs to strengthen future outbreak 
responses. Response aspects assessed included 
diagnostics, biorisk management and quality assur-
ance. The overall coverage of EBOV diagnostics in the 
European Union/European Economic Area (EU/EEA) 
was found to be adequate although some points for 
quality improvement were identified. These included 
the need for relevant International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) accreditation, the provision of 
EBOV external quality assessments (EQA) in periods 
where there is no emergency, facilitating access to 
controls and knowledge, biorisk management with-
out compromising biosafety and a rapid public health 
response, and the need for both sustained and con-
tingency funding for preparedness and response 
activities.
Background
From December 2013 onward, the world experienced the 
largest Ebola virus (EBOV) outbreak to date, with more 
than 28,000 cases including more than 11,000 deaths 
mostly in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone [1]. The 
outbreak with EBOV strain Zaire in West Africa was 
declared a public health emergency of international 
concern (PHEIC) by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) between 8 August 2014 and 29 March 2016 [2,3]. 
Upon declaration of the PHEIC, the European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) forecast that 
despite low probability of imported cases, a substan-
tial number of people would need to be investigated to 
rule out EBOV infection in the European Union (EU) and 
the European Economic Area (EEA) during the outbreak 
[4]. A modelling study listed four European countries 
(Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
(UK)) in the 16 countries most at risk for importation of 
EBOV, while three additional European countries (Italy, 
the Netherlands and Spain) were modelled to be at risk 
for transiting EBOV-infected travellers [5]. A risk for 
local transmission should also be considered in case 
of repatriation of patients or accidentally exposed per-
sons (e.g. healthcare workers and/or laboratory per-
sonnel) to European countries [6,7].
Two laboratory networks were actively involved in pro-
vision of EBOV diagnostic support: (i) the EU-funded 
joint-action initiative QUANDHIP (continued as EMERGE 
JA) that focused on high-consequence cross-border 
threats (highly pathogenic bacteria and risk group 
4 (RG4) viruses) and was activated by the EU Health 
Security Committee (HSC) in August 2014, and (ii) the 
ECDC-funded European Network for Imported Viral 
Diseases (ENIVD, now named EVD-LabNet [8-10]). In 
September 2014, an assessment through the ENIVD 
network showed that 31 laboratories, including eight 
biosafety level four (BSL4) facilities, were able to han-
dle EBOV diagnostic requests, and it was concluded 
that Europe had sufficient laboratory capacity to detect 
imported EBOV cases [11]. After the end of the PHEIC, 
EMERGE JA conducted an inventory of the demands on 
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EBOV diagnostic capacity and capability during the 
outbreak in European laboratories associated with 
its network and EVD-LabNet. This was done to gain 
insight into problems encountered, protocols used and 
lessons learned and to identify needs for training and 
other improvements to strengthen the European labo-
ratory response to future outbreaks.
Methods
Laboratories associated with the two European prepar-
edness networks of expert laboratories EMERGE JA [10] 
and EVD-LabNet [8] were asked to complete an online 
questionnaire (available from authors upon request) to 
assess the European laboratory response to the EBOV 
outbreak in West-Africa.
These included 38 laboratories in 23 EU/EEA countries 
and one non-EU/EEA country associated with EMERGE 
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JA as well as 58 laboratories in 27 EU/EEA countries, 
three EU candidate countries and one non-EU/EEA 
country associated with EVD-LabNet. Among these, 23 
laboratories were members of both networks and were 
asked to fill in the questionnaire only once.
The questionnaire was designed to address essential 
aspects of response targeting (i) EBOV diagnostics, (ii) 
biorisk management and (iii) quality assurance, while 
identifying (iv) challenges and needs. The question-
naire was sent on 13 July 2016 to all member institutes 
of both networks and closed on 20 September 2016. 
The involved laboratories where either national and 
international reference centres for EBOV diagnostics or 




Of the 69 invited laboratories, representatives from 
56 laboratories in 28 EU/EEA countries, two EU candi-
date countries, and two non-EU/EEA European coun-
tries completed the questionnaire (Figure 1). All 23 
laboratories that were members of both EMERGE JA 
and EVD-LabNet responded. Twenty-eight of 35 mem-
bers of EVD-LabNet alone and five of 14 laboratories 
associated with EMERGE JA alone responded. Of the 
eight BSL4 laboratories that were operational to con-
duct EBOV diagnostics during the PHEIC (Budapest, 
Hamburg, Lyon, Marburg, Porton Down, Rome and 
Stockholm in EU/EEA countries, and Spiez in a non-EU/
EEA country), all but one participated in the survey. 
Availability of Ebola virus diagnostics and level 
of preparedness
Thirty-one laboratories in 20 EU/EEA countries, one 
EU candidate country and two non-EU/EEA countries 
performed EBOV diagnostics (Figure 1). Laboratories 
in two of eight countries without EBOV diagnostics 
indicated that they had a pre-agreement with a labo-
ratory in another country to perform EBOV diagnostics 
(Figure 1). Of the 31 laboratories with EBOV diagnos-
tics, 15 laboratories in 12 countries indicated to have 
implemented EBOV diagnostics for the first time during 
the 2014-16 outbreak in West Africa, while 13 countries 
already had national laboratories with EBOV diagnos-
tics before that outbreak. In the following, we concen-
trate specifically on the survey responses from those 
31 EBOV diagnostic laboratories only. When fewer 
than 31 participants answered a question this is explic-
itly indicated.
Twenty-six laboratories in 21 countries enrolled and/
or trained additional staff in response to the outbreak. 
Twenty-three laboratories in 19 countries prepared new 
or updated existing standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) at the beginning of the PHEIC, while 19 labora-
tories in 17 countries indicated to have revised SOPs 
based on lessons learned during the PHEIC. Of the 
seven BSL4 laboratories, four laboratories indicated 
to have implemented new SOPs. These SOPs were all 
related to introduction of new commercial tests as 
back-up or replacement of existing tests. An inven-
tory of the type of SOPs that were adapted during the 
outbreak is given in Table 1. Only 14 laboratories in 11 
countries indicated to have received additional funding 
to respond to the EBOV outbreak.
Molecular, serological and differential 
diagnostics
All EBOV diagnostic laboratories performed molecu-
lar EBOV assays and had access to a positive control, 
including virus controls provided in commercial PCR 
kits. Overall, the laboratories indicated the use of a 
total of eight different commercial and 11 published 
in-house tests. For five in-house tests, no background 
information was given (Table 2).
Assessment of the level of molecular test result confir-
mation revealed that, of 23 laboratories that answered 
this question, 14 laboratories in 12 countries confirmed 
both positive and negative test results either through 
a second PCR test targeting another part of the EBOV 
genome or by sending the sample to a reference labo-
ratory. Six laboratories in five countries only sought 
confirmation of positive test results while three in three 
countries, including one BSL4 laboratory, never con-
firmed a test result. At the country level this translated 
to one country without any EBOV test confirmation and 
four countries with only confirmation of positive results. 
Figure 2
Available differential diagnostics in European Ebola virus 
diagnostic laboratories (n = 31) and number of countries 
they represent (n = 23)
















EHEC: Enterohaemorrhagic Escherichia coli.
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Eighteen of 25 laboratories that answered this question 
indicated that they had the possibility to refer samples 
to one or more BSL4 laboratories. The indicated refer-
ence BSL4 laboratories were Hamburg (n = 8), Marburg 
(n = 1), Porton Down (n = 2), Rome (n = 2) and Stockholm 
(n = 3) or ‘any laboratory within EMERGE JA’ (n = 2).
In-house serological assays were performed by nine 
laboratories in eight countries, which included five 
BSL4 laboratories. For seven of these in-house tests, a 
positive control was available. No further details about 
serology were asked as the role of serology in EBOV 
diagnostics is limited.
All laboratories indicated that they performed tests for 
additional pathogens that, based on expert opinion, 
could be part of the differential diagnosis of suspected 
EBOV patients (Figure 2). The BSL4 laboratories all pro-
vided differential diagnostics for three other relevant 
RG4 pathogens (Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever 
virus, Lassa virus and Marburg virus) as did nine BSL3 
laboratories in eight countries. 
To gain insight in the diagnostic burden, participants 
were asked how many samples were tested for EBOV 
in their laboratory in the period from March 2014 to 
September 2015. This question addressed the actual 
diagnostic burden in laboratories in Europe regardless 
of the origin of the diagnostic samples, i.e. whether 
from within or outside Europe. Four laboratories did 
not provide data and four laboratories in four countries 
indicated they had not had any diagnostic requests for 
EBOV in this period. The remaining 23 laboratories in 
20 countries tested a total of 3,342 samples of which 
2,868 (86%) were performed in the seven institutes 
with a BSL4 facility. Both sample counts consisted of 
responses defining precise numbers and responses 
giving a rounded estimate. A total of 253 samples of 
the submitted 3,342 were positive for EBOV RNA in six 
BSL4 and two BSL3 facilities in eight countries. The 
median time from arrival of the sample at the 23 labo-
ratories to the outcome of the EBOV test result was 7 
hours (range: 3.5–48 hours).
Fifteen laboratories in 11 countries, including all but 
one participating BSL4 laboratories, provided sup-
port to other (inter)national laboratories in the form of 
shared protocols, assays and/or positive control mate-
rial. When asked about the quality of collaboration 
among EU bodies and organisations in terms of sharing 
knowledge, e.g. SOPs, and materials for EBOV diagnos-
tics, the 30 responding laboratories gave a favourable 
evaluation on a Likert-scale from 0 = poor to 6 = excel-
lent: the median for both networks, excluding the BSL4 
laboratories, was 5 (range: 1–6), while the seven BSL4 
laboratories rated a 4 (range: 2–5).
Biorisk management
To gain insight in the operational BSL in the European 
laboratories that conducted first-line and/or reference 
EBOV diagnostics and in the modifications applied to 
address clinical requests in addition to EBOV exclusion 
testing, participants indicated the BSL used for EBOV 
diagnostics. Five laboratories in five countries con-
ducted EBOV diagnostics at BSL4, whereas 24 labora-
tories in 18 countries performed EBOV diagnostics at 
BSL3, including two laboratories with BSL4 facilities. 
One of two laboratories performing EBOV diagnostics 
at BSL2 indicated to do so upon bedside inactiva-
tion of samples from suspected EBOV patients. At the 
country level, this corresponded to four countries with 
EBOV diagnostics only at BSL4, one country with EBOV 
diagnostics at all three biosafety levels (BSL4, 3 and 
2) depending on the laboratory, and one country with 
EBOV diagnostics only at BSL2. Seventeen countries 
had EBOV diagnostics only at BSL3. Twenty-one of 24 
laboratories performing EBOV diagnostics at BSL3 indi-
cated to take extra precautionary measures in addition 
to regular BSL3 protocols. These measures included 
extra personal protective equipment (PPE) in addition 
to normal BSL3 PPE for 14 laboratories. The use of gog-
gles/face mask, coverall/head coverage, respirator, 
waterproof apron/long sleeves and boot covers, and 
the obligation to shower-out were indicated as adap-
tations. Fifteen laboratories had implemented addi-
tional sample inactivation into the BSL3 routine, either 
by heat inactivation or addition of 96% ethanol to the 
lysis buffer [12].
Seven laboratories in seven countries among the 30 
laboratories that answered this question also per-
formed clinical biochemistry and haematology on 
samples from suspected or confirmed EBOV cases and 
Figure 3
Challenges for laboratories to respond to the Ebola virus 
outbreak in West Africa (n = 37; 29 performing and eight 
not performing Ebola virus diagnostics)
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indicated to do so at BSL2 (n = 1), BSL3 (n = 5) or BSL4 
(n = 1). The laboratory that performed clinical biochem-
istry and haematology at BSL2 conducted EBOV diag-
nostics at BSL3.
Disinfection protocols to re-use equipment in case an 
EBOV case was confirmed were in place in 24 labora-
tories of 28 laboratories that answered this question. 
Ten laboratories in eight countries indicated that the 
laboratory had to be closed for the disinfection process 
and that this affected routine diagnostics.
Of the eight laboratories in eight countries that had 
received EBOV-positive diagnostic samples, four (two 
BSL4 and two BSL3 laboratories) indicated that they 
had implemented a special health surveillance protocol 
(e.g. temperature monitoring for 21 days) for laboratory 
employees who handled EBOV-positive specimens, 
while four laboratories (three BSL4 and one BSL3) had 
not.
Quality assurance
To gain insight in the level of quality control at the 
EBOV diagnostic laboratories, laboratories were 
asked to specify their level(s) of laboratory accredita-
tion. Twenty-one laboratories worked under a relevant 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
accreditation scheme (ISO 15189 [13], ISO 17025 [14], 
ISO 9001 [15]), of which 12 under ISO 15189 that is 
recommended for medical diagnostic laboratories [13] 
while 10 laboratories had no ISO accreditation at all. 
It is noteworthy that only four of the seven BSL4 labo-
ratories performed diagnostics under an ISO accredi-
tation of which two were under ISO-15189. Analysis 
at the country level showed 10 countries with one 
and one country with two EBOV laboratories with ISO 
15189 accreditation. Five countries had no national 
EBOV diagnostic laboratory with an ISO accreditation 
of which one indicated to have a national accreditation.
Another aspect of quality assurance is the participation 
of laboratories in external quality assessment (EQA) 
exercises. During the EBOV outbreak, two open inter-
national EQAs for testing of EBOV RNA were organised 
by WHO and ENIVD [16]. Nine of 30 responding labora-
tories participated in the WHO EBOV EQA, while 26 par-
ticipated in the ENIVD EQA [16]. Five BSL4 laboratories 
indicated to have participated in the closed QUANDHIP 
EBOV EQAs between 2012 and 2015. Two laboratories 
with EBOV diagnostics indicated not to have partici-
pated in any of the EBOV EQAs. At the country level, 
this translated to two countries with an EBOV diagnos-
tic laboratory without external quality assessment.
Finally, quality can be assured by using official diag-
nostic algorithms. Nine laboratories performed EBOV 
diagnostics based on the ECDC diagnostic algorithm. 
Four laboratories followed the WHO algorithm and five 
followed national guidelines. There were three labora-
tories that indicated to have adopted both ECDC and 
WHO guidelines. Ten laboratories did not answer this 
question.
Challenges and needs
Laboratories were asked to identify the main chal-
lenges they faced in connection with response to the 
EBOV outbreak in West Africa (Figure 3). The question 
was addressed by 29 EBOV diagnostic laboratories 
and eight non-EBOV diagnostic laboratories. The main 
challenges were the availability of trained personnel 
and positive control materials. The BSL4 laboratories 
indicated availability of funds and trained personnel 
as main issues. For laboratories that did not perform 
EBOV diagnostics during the outbreak, biosafety was 
among the main concerns.
When asked to identify training needs, 12 of 30 
responding laboratories indicated that the protocols 
Table 1
Overview of standard operating procedures prepared or updated at the start of and during the Ebola virus PHEIC by 
European Ebola virus diagnostic laboratories (n = 31 laboratories, n = 23 countries)
SOP topic Starta Duringa
Differential diagnosis, parallel testing other pathogens 2 1
Adaptation malaria diagnostics to BSL3 setting 1 0
EBOV testing upon implementation of new test, adapted test, additional targets 14 5
Workflow from biosafety perspective including sample taking, waste disposal, handling before and after inactivation, 
before and after BSL3 13 6
Usage of personal protective equipment 9 9
Shipment from peripheral laboratories to reference laboratory 3 0
Adaptation of case definition 1 0
Introduction of bedside blood inactivation 0 1
Revision of SOPs and training courses for personnel 0 1
Change inactivation procedure 0 4
BSL: biosafety level; PHEIC: public health emergency of international concern; SOP: standard operating procedure.
a Number of laboratories indicating preparation or revision of the indicated SOP at the start or during the EBOV outbreak.
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and response they had set up before the outbreak 
worked well and no further training was necessary. 
Seven laboratories suggested that a workshop on dif-
ferential EBOV diagnosis both for molecular and sero-
logical tests would be useful. Five laboratories asked 
for training courses in biosafety and four laboratories 
asked for PPE procedures. Further individual requests 
included courses on: laboratory sample handling, 
decontamination of rooms and cars, training of primary 
responders including bedside routine analyses, and 
advice on the best commercials assay systems.
Finally, laboratories were asked to give suggestions 
that could help improve preparedness and response in 
case of a future outbreak. Three main topics emerged: 
media communication, speed of the outbreak response 
and staff training. One laboratory indicated that con-
tradictory press releases had adverse effects on the 
diagnostic outbreak response by creating confusion 
and that this should be avoided during the next out-
break. Most recommendations to improve a future 
outbreak response were made regarding the speed of 
the response. Seven laboratories suggested to cre-
ate a system (e.g. a web portal at the networks’ web-
sites) that allows access to relevant scientific data and 
information on and access to control reagents. Other 
suggestions included the development of an interna-
tional concept, the establishment of a well-trained 
task-force, e.g. highly specialised treatment centres, 
and the quick identification of European experts and 
their contact information. Furthermore, it was noted 
that the transport to reference laboratories should be 
improved, and generic tests (e.g. pan-filovirus or syn-
drome-based, multiplex RT-PCR) should be advanced 
to improve identification of first cases without knowl-
edge of the causative agent. In addition, one laboratory 
requested a formal recommendation from authorities 
in EU countries to downgrade the BSL of diagnostics 
for European travellers with unknown infections by one 
level. Finally, one laboratory observed that issues of 
trained staff were the result of inexperience and/or dis-
comfort with BSL4 conditions and protocols owing to 
long periods between outbreaks. They proposed that 
access to (experimental) vaccines for the staff may 
alleviate some discomfort.
Discussion
The retrospective assessment of the European labora-
tory response to the EBOV outbreak in West Africa is 
an important part of international processes to identify 
bottlenecks in the current operational procedures and 
to improve the laboratory response and its geographic 
coverage in future outbreaks [17,18]. Although six coun-
tries had no in-country or pre-agreed external access to 
EBOV diagnostics, this would not exclude these coun-
tries establishing an ad hoc collaboration in emergent 
situations. The fact that half of the laboratories had 
implemented EBOV diagnostics during the outbreak 
in West Africa illustrates considerable flexibility under 
urgent circumstances which was also supported by the 
availability of commercial diagnostic kits. However, a 
weakness identified was that the surplus resources 
needed for an adequate response were not matched 
with funding in half of the laboratories. Sustained 
national and EU funding mechanisms are needed to 
ensure adequate and robust laboratory preparedness, 
and rapidly deployable contingency funds are needed 
for outbreak response.
A wide range of molecular diagnostic tests was used 
by the 31 laboratories. Although the comparative qual-
ity of the tests could not be assessed here, in silico 
and laboratory comparative assessments of different 
tests for EBOV Zaire were conducted during and after 
Table 2
Overview of in-house and commercial Ebola virus molecular tests used by European Ebola virus diagnostic laboratories 
(n = 31 laboratories, n = 23 countries)
In-house Total number of laboratories (countries) Commercial Total number of laboratories (countries)
Panning et al., 2007 [37] 5 (3) Altona 22 (16)
Gibb et al., 2001 [38] 4 (4) Cepheid 2 (2)
Ogawa et al., 2011 [39] 5 (5) Roche 2 (2)
Sanchez et al., 1999 [40] 3 (3) Biofire filmarray 2 (2)
Trombley et al., 2010 [41] 4 (4) Genesig 2 (2)
Huang et al., 2012 [42] 2 (2) Amplisens 1 (1)
Dedkov et al., 2016 [43] 1 (1) Bioline sensifast 1 (1)
Jaaskelainen et al., 2015 [44] 1 (1) Sacace 1 (1)
Weidmann et al., 2004 [45] 1 (1)
De la Vega et al., 2015 [46] 1 (1)
CDC, 2015 [47] 1 (1)
In-house not specified 5 (3)
CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
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the outbreak [11,16,19-21], with more information on 
test performances in clinical settings becoming avail-
able after the outbreak [22-25]. These provide points of 
action for improvement in European laboratories that 
have implemented suboptimal tests. The observation 
that only 14 laboratories confirmed all test outcomes is 
worrisome and needs improvement, especially in labo-
ratories that had no previous or no extensive experi-
ence in EBOV diagnostics.
The level and type of accreditation of the EBOV diag-
nostic laboratories requires improvement as quality 
assurance of diagnostic procedures is an important 
aspect of such accreditation. In the EQA organised by 
WHO and ENIVD during the PHEIC, results of 28% of 
participant laboratories showed need for improvement 
[16], indicating that quality of the EBOV diagnostics is 
a concern and should be monitored and improved by 
e.g. training and additional EQAs in periods between 
outbreaks. Although multiple EQAs were organised 
by QUANDHIP before and during the outbreak, these 
were for BSL4 laboratories only, thereby overlooking 
the EBOV preparedness and response in the majority 
of European laboratories [9,26,27] (A. DiCaro, personal 
communication, June 2017). Finally, it should be kept 
in mind that future outbreaks with strains other than 
EBOV Zaire or with a divergent EBOV Zaire strain would 
require new assessments and provision of positive 
controls.
Biosafety concerns were indicated by the majority of 
the 25 laboratories without EBOV diagnostics as one 
of the reasons that made them refrain from diagnos-
tic response to the outbreak. Ebola virus is listed as 
a RG4 pathogen, which requires high containment 
facilities for complex handling, while processing of 
diagnostic specimens can be done at BSL3 [28,29]. 
Especially when public health issues (e.g. rapid out-
break response) are at stake, daily practice increas-
ingly follows a biorisk management approach, where 
the exact working conditions are based on boundaries 
set by local biosafety and biosecurity assessments and 
official audits, using the RG and BSL classifications as 
a basis [30,31]. In case BSL4 and BSL3 facilities are not 
available or other biosafety solutions must be imple-
mented for practical reasons, early steps of a validated 
pathogen inactivation, as exemplified by one labora-
tory using bedside inactivation, should be considered 
and a biorisk assessment should result in protective 
measures which will be safe for workers and environ-
ments [32,33]. Indeed, 21 of 25 laboratories with EBOV 
diagnostics at BSL3 took extra precautionary meas-
ures. The questionnaire did, however, not allow to 
identify the motivation for these changes, e.g. whether 
it was done to increase the (perception of) biosafety 
or to acquire local permission to handle samples from 
biosafety staff. While laboratories in the EVD-LabNet 
and EMERGE JA networks with routine diagnostic work-
flows for a range of rare exotic viral diseases often have 
BSL3 laboratories, additional laboratory investigations 
required for patient management are typically not done 
in high containment facilities.
Collaboration among EU bodies and organisations 
and between laboratories is critical to ensure good 
outbreak response. This survey suggested a mostly 
positive view of collaboration in terms of sharing 
knowledge and materials, which indicates that the 
two EU laboratory preparedness and response net-
works provide added value. The most frequent rec-
ommendation to help improve preparedness in case 
of future outbreaks was to establish a central system 
that would allow quick and easy exchange of relevant, 
anonymised scientific data and control reagents. The 
availability of positive control materials was one of the 
main challenges EBOV diagnostic laboratories faced. 
It could be provided through establishment of such a 
portal on the networks’ member sites and accelerated 
access to materials via portals such as the European 
Virus Archive (EVAg) [34].
While the EBOV outbreak in West Africa was the larg-
est on record, the risk for Europe was considered 
low [4,35,36]. Nevertheless, the outbreak activated a 
broad laboratory and clinical response in Europe. One 
approach to manage such response to an outbreak with 
limited risks could be to centralise such diagnostics in 
a limited number of BSL4 laboratories. In line with this, 
we observed that a vast majority of the samples tested 
for EBOV in the European laboratories were tested by 
the BSL4 laboratories. However, while samples from 
patients outside Europe were most likely to be sent 
to the BSL4 laboratories, local suspected cases were 
most likely to be tested in first-line, local diagnostic 
laboratories without BSL4 capacity but with the pos-
sibility for confirmatory testing in BSL4 laboratories. 
Furthermore, in the early phases of an outbreak, it is 
difficult to predict whether scaled up capacity will be 
needed. Also, many specialised diagnostic laborato-
ries of both laboratory preparedness networks provide 
haemorrhagic fever differential diagnostics besides the 
BSL4 laboratories [8,10] and were called in to provide 
guidance for national and institutional level prepared-
ness planning for EBOV patients.
Conclusion
There are various national approaches for prepared-
ness and an exchange of experiences could be useful. 
Therefore, the lessons learned from this survey and the 
indicated reasons for not performing EBOV diagnostics 
can be used to optimise the future response of clinical 
and specialised (containment) laboratories for high-
threat pathogens.
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